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Abstract
We measure the quantitative importance of labor mobility as a vehicle for the transmission
of knowledge and skills across firms. For this purpose we create a unique data set that matches
all applications of Danish firms at the European Patent Office to linked employer-employee reg-
ister data for the years 1999–2002. The Danish workforce is split into “R&D workers”, who hold
a bachelor’s or a master’s degree in a technical field, and “non–R&D workers”. We find that
mobile R&D workers (“R&D joiners”’) contribute more to patenting activity than immobile
R&D workers. Furthermore, R&D workers who have previously been employed by a patenting
firm (“patent exposed workers”) have a larger effect on patenting activity than R&D workers
without this experience. Patent exposed R&D joiners constitute the most productive group of
workers: for firms that patented prior to 1999, one additional worker of this type relates to an
increase in the number of patent applications of the new employer by 0.0646. This corresponds
to a 14 percent increase in the mean number of yearly patent applications. We also find that
mobility of R&D workers increases the joint patenting activity of the donor and recipient firms,
confirming the importance of labor mobility for innovation in the economy.
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“A major unresolved issue in the area of economics of technology is the
identification and measurement of R&D spillovers, the benefits that
one company receives from R&D activity of another.” (Griliches, 1990,
p. 1,688)
1 Introduction
Knowledge is one of the main sources of the competitive advantage of firms (Kogut
and Zander, 1992; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). Part of this knowledge resides
in the people working in the organization and is only weakly protected by intel-
lectual property rights (Gilson, 1998). Thus, mobility of people represents both a
threat and an opportunity: the knowledge base of a firm can be strengthened by
employees joining the firm but weakened by employees leaving. Consistent with
this view, mutual funds acquire the resources to introduce new products by hiring
managers from the outside (Rao and Drazin, 2002) and semiconductor firms enter
markets where experience of new managers is available (Boeker, 1997). Looking
at the downside of mobility, Wezel, Cattani and Pennings (2006) show that group
exit is a source of partnership dissolution in the accounting industry.
Inter–firm mobility may not only affect the performance of individual firms
but of entire regions. Saxenian (1994) as well as Almeida and Kogut (1999) have
documented how engineers and technical workers in Silicon Valley change jobs
repeatedly, contributing to knowledge transfer and rapid technological progress.
Inter-firm mobility is thus a source of knowledge sharing among firms, so–called
“technology spillovers”, which are identified by macroeconomists as a main driver
of sustained economic growth (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).1
There is a substantial body of evidence from surveys to date (Mansfield,
1985; Zander and Kogut, 1995), patent files (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Kim
and Marschke, 2005; Song, Almeida and Wu, 2003), and litigation (Gilson, 1999;
Hoti, McAleer and Slottje, 2006) indicating that mobility is a source of knowledge
transfers between firms. However, it is primarily qualititative in nature, and little
evidence exists about the quantitative effects of mobility on firm performance.
In this paper we take a step forward towards assessing the quantitative impor-
tance of mobility by measuring how labor mobility affects innovation in Danish
firms. For this purpose, we have constructed a dataset that combines patent
applications by Danish firms to the European Patent Office (EPO) with matched
employer–employee register data that contains a complete record of mobility in
the Danish labor market. Some of the questions that we address are: Is labor
1See also Fallick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer (2006) for a recent analysis of mobility inside
the computer industry in Silicon Valley.
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mobility associated with an increase in innovation by the new employer as mea-
sured by patent applications? How does the answer to this question depend on
the experience of the person moving in terms of her education and the patenting
activity of her previous employer? Is mobility associated with an overall increase
in the new and old employers’ joint innovation? These are central questions for
our understanding of mobility as a source of competitive advantage for firms and
regions to which the existing literature does not provide answers.
To answer these questions we identify the group of persons who is likely to
possess valuable knowledge and measure whether their movements between firms
contribute to explaining firm–level patenting activity. Specifically, a firm’s work
force is split into “R&D workers” and “non–R&D workers” defined according to
the level and the subject of their highest educational level. Persons with a bach-
elor’s or a master’s degree in natural sciences are, e.g., classified as R&D workers
whereas persons with the same level of education in humanities will be termed
non–R&D workers. We identify the persons that have recent experience working
in an R&D active environment by introducing a second dimension, “patent ex-
posure”. A person is “patent exposed” if the firm she was employed by in the
previous period applied for a patent during that period. Otherwise, she is “not
patent exposed”. The idea is here that patent exposed persons are more likely to
have accumulated knowledge and skills that can serve as inputs in the production
of further innovations than non–exposed persons. We introduce a third and final
dimension in order to keep track of inter–firm mobility. A person belongs in any
period t to one of the following groups: “stayers” (worked in firm in the period
t− 1), “joiners” (joined the firm in period t), “leavers” (left the firm after period
t− 1), or “unknown” (entered the Danish labor market in period t).
Our point of departure in the analysis is a standard patent production function
at the firm level that maps innovation inputs, the different types of labor and
capital, into patent counts and controls for both unobserved and observed firm–
specific heterogeneity. To correct for unobserved permanent differences in firms’
patent productivity, we utilize the very long “pre–sample” patent histories at
our disposal. Specifically, we employ the suggestion of Blundell, Griffith and van
Reenen (1995) to use a firm’s average number of patents over this pre–sample
period as an observable proxy for unobservable permanent productivity. Because
a prominent feature of our sample is an increasing trend in the overall level of
patenting during the pre–sample period, we extend the Blundell, Griffith and van
Reenen (1995) approach to allow for trending.
Our analysis shows that R&D workers contribute more to patenting activity
than non–R&D workers irrespective of exposure status or mobility record. An
additional R&D joiner with patent exposure increases, e.g., the number of patent
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applications by 0.0112, corresponding to a 184 percent increase in the number
of applications for the average firm in the population given a mean number of
patents across firms of 0.006. This is more than five times the contribution of a
non–R&D joiner with exposure. The increase in the number of patents of 184
percent seems excessive. This figures needs to be, however, interpreted before
the background of an average number of workers of this sort of 0.0007 across all
firms. As many as 99.2 firms do not employ any R&D joiner with exposure. An
increase in the number of R&D joiners with exposure by one thus is a very drastic
change for most firms.
For firms that patented prior 1990 the effect of one additional R&D joiner
with exposure on the number of patent application is 0.0646 which relates to an
increase in the number of patents of this type of firms by 14 percent. These firms
apply for 0.45 patents per year on average.
Regarding the importance of patent exposure, we find that joiners with patent
exposure contribute more to patenting activity than joiners with similar observ-
able characteristics but no patent exposure. Patent exposure is also associated
with a higher patent productivity for stayers. These findings are consistent with
the notion that workers in patenting firms acquire knowledge and skills that
increase their productivity in the production of new inventions. Furthermore,
the difference between the contribution of exposed and non–exposed workers to
patenting is shown to be larger for R&D workers than for non–R&D workers, in-
dicating that workers with an R&D–relevant education have a larger absorptive
capacity.
For firm strategy as well as public policy a central question is to what extent
the fruits of R&D can be shared among firms. We address this question in
two steps. First, we show that the mobility of R&D workers increases the joint
patenting activity of the donor and the recipient firm. This could either be due
to technology spillovers as envisioned in the literature on regional and national
growth or be the outcome of a well–functioning labor market that allocates labor
to its most productive use. In the second step we develop a stylized model of a
competitive labor market to try to disentangle these two explanations. There are
two types of workers, patent exposed and not exposed workers. A non–patent
exposed worker’s labor input is rival (physical labor, human capital, etc.) and can
thus be used only by one firm at a time. A patent exposed worker’s labor input
has an additional, non–rival component, namely knowledge. We show that in
equilibrium the recipient firm experiences a larger gain on average when exposed
workers join the firm than when non–exposed workers join. More surprisingly,
we find that although the knowledge that the patent exposed workers possess is
non–rival and stays with the donor firm, the donor firms experience a larger loss
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on average when exposed workers leave than when non–exposed workers leave.
The first prediction of the model is strongly confirmed by the data whereas the
evidence for the second implication is somewhat weaker. Overall, our results are
consistent with the widely held belief that labor mobility is a source of knowledge
sharing among firms.
Turning to the related literature, the main obstacle to the empirical analysis of
inter–firm mobility is to find comprehensive data on the movements of individuals
across firms. Progress has been made in recent papers where long time–series
on mobility inside the semi–conductor industry and the financial services sector
have been constructed. These studies have documented how labor inflows can
transfer the necessary skills and knowledge to offer products and services outside
of the firm’s current business areas (Boeker, 1997; Rao and Drazin, 2002) but
outflows may disrupt the functioning of the organization (Wezel, Cattani and
Pennings, 2006).2 While these studies show how mobility transfers skills and
induces learning across firms, they contain little information regarding the role
of mobility in the innovation process.
In order to analyze the importance of mobility for innovation, a number stud-
ies have used patent data. Almeida and Kogut (1999) track the careers of the
most productive research engineers in the semiconductor industry. They provide
evidence on the role of mobility as source of technology spillovers by showing that
firms cite each other more in their patent applications in regions with high labor
turnover. Additional evidence is provided by Kim and Marschke (2005) who show
that firms have a higher propensity to patent in regions with high labor mobility,
which is consistent with a theory where firms patent their inventions to prevent
misappropriation by former employees.
Closer to the approach taken in this paper, patent files have been used to
track the mobility of inventors across firms. Song, Almeida and Wu (2003) study
mobility within and across industries and technology classes and use patent cita-
tions to explore the conditions under which hiring results in knowledge acquisi-
tion for the new employer. Hoisl (2007) combines data on mobility from patent
files with background information about the inventors from questionnaires. She
shows that mobile inventors are on average more productive and that mobility
is productivity–enhancing. While providing interesting insights regarding mo-
bility and its effects on innovation, the use of patent files to trace mobility has
a major weakness: only moves by inventors that result in a patent at the new
employer (successful moves) are registered whereas moves that do not result in
2Interestingly, Madsen, Mosakowski and Zaheer (2003) show that the inflow of personnel to
trading floors is associated with retention of the current organization in the foreign exchange
industry rather than organizational innovations.
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a patent (unsuccessful moves) are not. Toivanen and Va¨a¨na¨nen (2008) remedy
this shortcoming by combining data on inventors of Finnish patents with linked
employer–employee data. They find a significant and potentially long–lasting
wage premium for inventors of granted patents. Our analysis similarly exploits
detailed data on labor movements but the focus is different as we consider the
effects of mobility as measured by firms’ innovative productivity. This is arguably
better suited to answer the questions outlined above regarding the expected (or,
average) effect of mobility on innovation in the population of firms.
Our data and empirical analyzes allow us to address new research questions,
but we wish to be upfront regarding limitations of our approach. First, the
mobility of persons between firms is clearly endogenous. We measure therefore
the total effect of mobility resulting from the match between persons’ labor supply
and firms’ labor demand, the effects on the organization of inflows and outflows
of personnel, knowledge transfers, etc. We discuss this issue, which is common to
the literature, in detail in the text. Second, our approach allows us compare the
effects of mobility among different types of workers. However, as previously noted
we do not identify the formal inventors as stated in the patent applications. Our
results should therefore be interpreted as representing an average person engaged
in R&D rather than the star scientist who has been the main focus of the literature
until now.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section details the
hypotheses tested and the theory underlying them. Section 3 describes the data
and outlines the definitions used in the analysis. Section 4 characterizes the
econometric approach and Section 5 provides some descriptive statistics. The
main results are reported in Section 6. Section 7 provides some robustness checks.
Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Theory and hypotheses
We differentiate the labor inputs of workers according to education, patent expo-
sure, and mobility status. In the following we first compare workers within each
of the three dimensions and derive theoretical hypotheses regarding their contri-
bution to patenting activity. Afterwards, the interactions between mobility and
the other two dimensions are considered, which generates additional hypotheses.
Our hypotheses are evaluated in view of the empirical evidence in Section 6.
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2.1 Education
Our empirical approach assumes that it is possible to use educational attainment
to identify the workers that are central to the production of patentable inventions.
Our definitions of R&D workers and non–R&D workers are in accordance with
survey evidence on the education of inventors in Denmark (Kaiser, 2006). Still,
an important consistency check for our empirical analysis is that R&D workers
contribute more to the production of patentable inventions than do non R&D
workers. Our first hypothesis simply states as follows:
H. 1: R&D workers contribute more to patenting activity than non R&D work-
ers.
2.2 Exposure
The variable “patent exposure” measures whether a worker has recent experience
working for a firm that applied for an EPO patent. From the data it is not
possible to infer whether the worker was directly involved in the project that
lead to the patent application. We therefore interpret the exposure variable as
an indicator of recent experience working in an R&D active environment where
valuable knowledge and skills can be acquired. This is in line with the literature
showing that not all innovations are patented (Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Brouwer
and Kleinknecht, 1999; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000) but that patents are
appropriate indicators for innovative activity (Griliches, 1990).
For R&D workers who are the prime candidates for transferring knowledge,
these arguments suggest that joiners with patent exposure will transfer more
knowledge to their new employer than joiners without exposure. This should, in
turn, translate into a higher innovation output as measured by patent applications
for the new employer. Hence, we hypothesize:
H. 2(a): R&D joiners with exposure contribute more to patenting activity than
R&D joiners without exposure.
The knowledge resulting from R&D opens up new technical opportunities
due to the cumulative nature of innovation. At the same time R&D experience
enables the workers to exploit these opportunities better through more efficient
search (Nelson, 1982) and use of outside knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
These effects suggest that workers with recent R&D experience not only have
acquired more knowledge that can be used in the production of new innovation
than workers without R&D experience but are also better at using it. Comparing
across firms, we hypothesize:
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H. 2(b): R&D stayers with exposure contribute more to patenting activity than
R&D stayers without exposure.
2.3 Mobility
Technology “spillovers”, or “knowledge externalities”, play a central role in mod-
ern theories of economic growth (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Once
knowledge is created through R&D, it spills over to other firms that can use it
as an input in the production of superior goods and new knowledge. Further-
more, since technology spillovers tend to be localized (Audretsch and Feldman,
1996; Keller, 2004), they are a source of agglomeration economies and regional
competitive advantage (Porter, 2000; Saxenian, 1994). The importance of tech-
nology spillovers stems from knowledge being, at least partly, non–rival in nature
and therefore shareable among firms (Arrow, 1962; David, 1992). Hence, a cen-
tral question in the debate regarding the role of labor mobility for innovation
is whether it leads to transfer of non–rival knowledge. We will return to this
question below. For now notice that if non–rival knowledge is transferred, then
inter–firm mobility of personnel should result in a knowledge gain for the recip-
ient firm without a similar loss for the donor firm. We will refer to this as a
“spillover effect”.
A worker’s labor input has many other components apart from non–rival
knowledge such as, e.g., physical labor, problem–solving abilities, and the use of
tacit knowledge. For our purposes, the key characteristic of these other compo-
nents is that they are rival in nature.
The labor market should, as any other well–functioning market, induce an
efficient match between workers’ labor supply and firms’ labor demand. Individ-
uals work in firms where they have a high productivity and leave if their labor
inputs find a better use (Jovanovic, 1979; Mortensen, 1982). There will thus be
mobility in the labor market that is not driven by knowledge acquisition motives,
but primarily serves to match the workers’ rival labor inputs to firms’ demands.
We will refer to the productivity gains that arise from this matching process as
a “matching effect.”3
Both the spillover and the matching effect would suggest that mobility is
associated with a net productivity gain:
H. 3(a): The sum of an R&D joiner’s and an R&D leaver’s contribution to
3This is, of course, not to say that employment relations are not discontinued for many other
reasons or that the market ensures that all labor is put to its most productive use at all points
in time. Still, we would expect that mobility, on average, results in a productivity increase due
to better matching.
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patenting activity is positive.
H. 3(b): The sum of a non R&D joiner’s and a non R&D leaver’s contribution
to patenting activity is positive.
2.4 Mobility and Exposure
R&D workers with patent exposure are more likely to transfer non–rival knowl-
edge than R&D workers without patent exposure. We would therefore expect
that mobility of R&D workers with patent exposure is driven both by spillover
and matching effects whereas mobility of R&D workers without patent exposure
is driven primarily, or to a larger extent, by the latter effect.
To conceptualize the difference between exposed and non–exposed workers,
consider the following stylized model. An individual R&D worker’s rival labor
inputs contribute to the production of patentable inventions. The value of these
inputs is VD to the current employer, the potential (D)onor firm. The worker is
matched according to some matching process to an outside firm, the potential
(R)ecipient firm, that values the rival labor inputs VR. For simplicity, assume
that VD and VR are independently and uniformly distributed, VD ∼ U [0, V D] and
VR ∼ U [0, V D]. On top of their rival labor inputs, patent exposed R&D workers
also bring knowledge that has value s to the recipient firm. Since this part of the
knowledge is non–rival, the donor firm does not experience a loss if the worker
leaves.4 Finally, there is a fixed cost of mobility V that includes cost of training
for the recipient firm, the cost of finding a replacement for the donor firm, etc.
Assuming that the two firms compete in wages for workers, e.g., modelled as
a first price auction, mobility arises if and only if it increases the joint profit of
the two firms. Hence an R&D worker switches from the donor to the recipient
firm if and only if:
Non-exposed R&D worker : VR − VD︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net benefit from mobility
≥ V︸︷︷︸
Cost of mobility
,
Exposed R&D worker : VR + s− VD︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net benefit from mobility
≥ V︸︷︷︸
Cost of mobility
.
Figure 1 illustrates the labor market outcome.
Insert Figure 1 about here!
We observe the productivity gains and losses resulting only from the realized
moves in our data. For the exposed and the non–exposed R&D workers, this
4We assume here that the firms are not competing in the product market.
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corresponds to combinations of (VR, VD) below the VR + s − VD = V –line and
the VR + s− VD = V –line, respectively. The square (dot) illustrates the average
value of VR and VD conditional on mobility for the exposed and the non–exposed
R&D workers, respectively. Looking first at the donor firm, the average value
of VD is larger for exposed than for non–exposed workers. Hence, although the
knowledge that the patent exposed workers transfer is non–rival, and therefore
remains with the donor firm, the prediction is that firms on average experience
a larger loss when exposed workers leave than when non–exposed workers leave.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H. 4: An exposed R&D leaver subtracts more from patenting activity than a
non–exposed R&D leaver.
A formal proof for Hypothesis 4 is presented in Appendix A.
Turning to the gain of the recipient firm, the average value of VR is lower
for R&D workers with patent exposure than for R&D workers without patent
exposure. In the data, however, we observe the average gain of the recipient
firm from the rival labor inputs plus the value of the non–rival knowledge, s.
This corresponds to the triangle in the figure, which is north–east of the dot.
Therefore, conditional on mobility, hiring an exposed worker results on average
in a larger productivity gain for the recipient firm than hiring a non–exposed
worker. This implication is tested by Hypothesis 2(a).
2.5 Mobility and Education
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that individuals differ in their abilities to
identify valuable knowledge, to assimilate it, and to apply it to a new context
(their “absorptive capacity”). Formal training in a relevant field is likely to
increase an individual’s absorptive capacity. Thus, we would expect that R&D
workers have a higher absorptive capacity, and thus benefit more from working in
an active R&D environment, than non R&D workers. This leads to the following
set of hypotheses:
H. 5(a): The difference in the contribution of joiners with and without exposure
is larger for R&D workers than for non–R&D workers.
H. 5(b): The difference in the contribution of stayers with and without exposure
is larger for R&D workers than for non–R&D workers.
H. 5(c): The difference in the contribution of leavers with and without exposure
is larger for R&D workers than for non–R&D workers.
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3 Data
Data on all patent applications to the EPO that were filed for between 1978 and
2002 by at least one applicant with Danish residency constitute the core of our
data set. Patent applications are used rather than patent grants because the
average grant time at the EPO of four to five years (Kaiser and Schneider, 2005)
implies that a substantial number of patents applied for during the time period
considered for estimation (1999–2002) would be lost if patent grants were used
instead of patent applications.
The “time stamp” of the patent applications is the “priority date”, the date
at which the invention was first filed for patent protection at the EPO or any
national patent office. The EPO data consist of 11,784 patents in total by 2,627
unique non–private Danish applicants over the period 1978–2002.
The distribution of the economic and technological value of patents is heavily
skewed in the sense that few patents have a very high value while the bulk of
patents have very little value as discussed, e.g., by Harhoff, Narin, Scherer and
Vopel (1999); Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam (1998), and Hall, Jaffe and Trajten-
berg (2005). Trajtenberg (1990) shows that there is a close relationship between
the number of citations a patent receives (“forward citations”) and the social
value of the inventions in the computer tomography industry. Thus, he suggests
to approximate value by patent forward citations since they capture the enor-
mous heterogeneity in the “quality” or “importance” of patents. The idea is that
valuable patents receive many citations by patents that follow while less valuable
patents will receive few citations or no citations at all. Like Trajtenberg (1990),
we weight each patent by one plus the number of citations the patent received
within a three years period after the EPO publication.5 Our patent citations
data stem from the “EPO/OECD patent citations database” that is available
from the OECD (Webb, Dernis, Harhoff and Hoisl, 2005) and covers the period
1978–2006.
The EPO data do not come with a unique firm identifying number of the
kind used by Statistics Denmark, the provider of the firm–level and employee–
level data. We hence, mostly manually, attached our EPO data with Statistics
Denmark’s firm identifiers. As described by Kaiser and Schneider (2005), we
exactly matched 95 percent of all unique patent applicants. The unmatched
five percent refer primarily to firms that went out of business before 1996. The
corresponding information would have been lost in our analysis anyway since our
firm–level data starts in 1999 only.
5 A time window of five years is often used, but we have chosen a shorter window as our
citation data ends less than four years after the patent data.
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Statistics Denmark provided us with firm registry data, most importantly
sector affiliation and the book value of physical capital, and with registry data
on employee characteristics, most importantly the number of employees and their
highest level of education. Our firm–level data is available for the years 1999–
2002. Our control group of non–patenting firms is the universe of firms active in
Denmark. We do discard, however, sectors without any EPO patent application
between 1978 and 2002. Sectors are defined according to the three digit NACE
Rev. 1 industrial classification level. We “expand” our patent data such that we
obtain one observation for each applicant per year. Firms that did not file for
an application at the EPO in a particular year are assigned a 0 for the number
of patent applications in that year. In a final step we merge the firm–level data
with employee–level data which allows us to track the employment history of each
worker across firms.
We lose some observations due to missing values, in particular due to missing
values in the firm–level data. We lose the first year of observation for each firm
since we use lagged explanatory and endogenous variables.
Our main estimation results are based on 206,645 firm–year observations on
90,725 unique firms. A total of 352 unique firms patented at least ones be-
tween 2000 and 2002, the total number of patents in that period is 484, and the
citations–weighted total is 1,987.
4 Empirical model
Our point of departure is a standard patent production function that maps firms’
innovation input into patent counts and controls for both unobserved and ob-
served firm–specific heterogeneity. Given that innovation is an inherently dy-
namic process, we also account for possible state dependence in patenting activ-
ity: past patenting activity is very likely to have a positive impact on current
patenting activity (Flaig and Stadler, 1994). We discuss in turn the specifica-
tion of human capital terms, the treatment of state dependence and unobserved
heterogeneity, further control variables included in the model, and the functional
form of the patent production function.
4.1 Human capital variables
We consider the human capital of R&D workers as the most important input
factor in patent production. According to German survey data, labor costs make
up about two thirds of all R&D costs in German firms (Stifterverband, 2007).
We do not have data on R&D expenditures on tangible assets at our disposal but
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control for capital stock — as measured by its book value — in the estimations.
While existing studies measure R&D inputs either by the overall number of R&D
workers or total R&D expenditures (Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen 1995,
2002; Hall, Hausman and Griliches, 1986; Cre´pon and Duguet 1997; Hall and
Ham Ziedonis, 2000; Licht and Zoz, 1998), the richness of our data allows us to
take a much more differentiated look at the marginal contributions of different
types of labor.
We distinguish human capital effects along three critical dimensions. The first
concerns the meaning of an “R&D worker”, the second the meaning of “mobility”
and the third refers to the meaning of “patent exposure”.
R&D workers and non–R&D workers: We define “R&D workers” vs. “non–
R&D workers” by using information on the highest level of education attained
by the worker. We differentiate between nine skill groups in total, which we
describe in more detail in Appendix B. Our main definition of R&D workers in-
cludes both workers with long or medium length R&D educations. This includes
workers with a bachelor’s, master’s or Ph.D. degree in R&D–related subjects like
e.g. engineering, chemistry, mathematics, medicin, statistics, physics and biol-
ogy. The definition corresponds most closely to the finding of Kaiser (2006) who
uses patent inventor survey data to show that Danish inventors are most likely
to hold a bachelor’s degree or higher.6 As a robustness check we consider in Sec-
tion 7 a “narrow” definition of R&D workers, which includes only workers with a
long R&D-related education (master’s or Ph.D. level), and a “broad” definition,
which also comprises of workers with a short R&D–related education like labo-
ratory technicians or process technicians.
Mobility: We also differentiate workers in terms of their mobility. “Stayers” are
workers employed by firm i both at time t and time t− 1. “Joiners” are workers
who is employed by firm i at time t but not at time t− 1. “Leavers” are workers
who were employed by firm i at time t− 1 but no longer at time t. A final group
of workers are employed with firm i at time t but their employment history is
unknown. Although a tiny fraction of the “unknown” workers are workers from
foreign countries, most have graduated recently and we shall refer to these work-
ers as “graduates” hereafter.
Patent exposure: We define a worker as being “patent exposed” if the firm she
was employed with at t− 1 applied for a patent at time t− 1. A patent exposed
6More precisely, 30.5 percent of the inventors hold a Bachelor’s degree, 40.8 percent a Mas-
ter’s degree and 17.4 percent a Ph.D. degree.
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“stayer” hence is a worker who was employed with firm i at both t and t−1 with
firm i applying for at least one patent at t− 1. Since the employment history of
recent graduates is not tracked, no distinction can be made here with respect to
their patent exposure.
Combining the above three dimensions yields a total of 14 different types of
labor:
(1) R&D joiners with patent exposure.
(2) R&D joiners without patent exposure.
(3) R&D stayers with patent exposure.
(4) R&D stayers without patent exposure.
(5) R&D workers without prior employment history.
(6) Non R&D joiners with patent exposure.
(7) Non R&D joiners without patent exposure.
(8) Non R&D stayers with patent exposure.
(9) Non R&D stayers without patent exposure.
(10) Non R&D workers without prior employment history.
(11) R&D leavers with patent exposure.
(12) R&D leavers without patent exposure.
(13) Non R&D leavers with patent exposure.
(14) Non R&D leavers without patent exposure.
Groups (1) through (10) constitute the firm’s current labor force. Workers in
groups (11) through (14) are no longer part of the firm’s labor force.
We specify human capital effects as “composition effects” measured by the
shares of each type of labor currently employed, i.e. skill groups (1) through (10)
and “leaver” effects in terms of the ratio of the number of workers in each of the
groups (11) through (14) relative to the current total number of workers of the
firm:7
9∑
k=1
γksk︸ ︷︷ ︸ +
14∑
l=11
δlrl︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
composition effects leaver effects
(1)
7Non–exposed non–R&D workers (group 10) are left out as the comparison group. The
coefficient estimates on the remaining groups are to be interpreted relative to the effects of this
comparison group.
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Here sk denotes the share of labor type k in total current employment of firm,
rl denotes the ratio of leaver group l to total employment. The sign of each γ
coefficient indicates the direction of the contribution of each group of workers to
relative to the comparison group. The δ coefficients measure the effects of leavers
and are therefore be expected to be negative.
The coefficients in Equation (1) do not have a direct economic interpretation
such as marginal effects or elasticities. We therefore present our results both in
terms of marginal effects — the percentage effects of a one worker change on the
expected number of patents — and absolute changes in the number of patents.8
4.2 State dependence
The standard treatment of state dependence in patent production, e.g. Blundell,
Griffith and van Reenen (1995), relies on a measure of a firm’s previous success
in patenting: the discounted stock of patents. The discounted patent stock of
firm i in period t− 1 is:
Git−1 = Pit−1 + (1− ω)Git−2, (2)
where Pit−1 denotes the number of patent applications of firm i at time t − 1
and ω is a discount factor. State dependence is hence introduced to the model
through the term Pit−1, the lagged number of patent applications. We follow the
suggestion of Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1995) and use a 30 per cent
depreciation rate. Our results remain robust to alternative discount factors.
While such state dependence measures are usually found to be significant
even when controlling for firm size, e.g. by the stock of capital, Hausman, Hall
and Griliches (1984); Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1995); Blundell, Griffith
and Windmeijer (1999), it leaves open the interpretation of the reasons for state
dependence in patenting. With complete longitudinal data on labor flows we
can add much more detail. Our approach allows the effects of state dependence
(that is, of previous patenting exposure) to reside to different degrees within the
different types of workers that constitute the firm’s labor force as a part of their
“intellectual human capital” (Zucker, Darby and Brewer, 1998).
4.3 Unobserved heterogeneity
Unobserved permanent firm heterogeneity implies that firms may differ in terms of
their patent productivities irrespective of their previous history in patenting and
the size and composition of their current labour force. This creates a potential
8Appendix C shows how the marginal effects are calculated.
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problem in separating out the contributions of different factors in the patent
production function. For example, a firm with high unobservable “patent ability”
may attract R&D workers who are also (unobservably) more able than the average
R&D worker, or it may employ capital more productively than firms of lower
ability. In such cases, and with no correction for unobserved patent productivity,
one would tend to overestimate the marginal contributions of R&D workers or
capital in the patent production function.
To correct for unobserved permanent differences in patent productivity we
utilize the fact that we have very long “pre–sample” histories at our disposal,
namely 22 years of observations (1977–1998) on patenting activity prior to our
“sample” data on workforce characteristics and other observable firm character-
istics (1999–2002). Specifically, we employ the suggestion of Blundell, Griffith
and van Reenen (1995) to use a firm’s average number of patents over this pre–
sample period as an observable proxy for unobservable permanent productivity.
Their so–called “Pre–Sample Mean Estimator” (PSME) yields superior results
compared to alternatives that are based on the generalized methods of moments
(GMM) framework (Blundell, Griffith and Windmeijer 1999).
Since a prominent feature of our data is an overall increase in the level of
patenting during the pre–sample period, we extend the Blundell, Griffith and
van Reenen (1995) approach by normalizing a firm’s number of patents in a pre–
sample year by the total number of patents applied for during that year. We
provide details on the normalization in Appendix D.
Many of the firms in our data never applied for a single patent. We again
follow Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1995) as well as Blundell, Griffith and
Windmeijer (1999) and include a dummy variable for firms having applied for at
least one patent during the pre–sample period. This variable also acts as a remedy
for the so–called “zero–inflation problem” that is common to many analyzes of
economic count data (Mullahy, 1997).
4.4 Control variables
Our model specification further controls for a number of variables commonly
found to be important in the patenting literature. They include measures of firm
size (total employment and capital stock, both in logs) as well as sectoral, regional
and year dummies. We also include the rate of growth of employment to separate
out mobility effects from the effects of firms pursuing “growth strategies”.
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4.5 Count data models
Our count data models use a common specification of the conditional mean func-
tion. We specify the (citation–weighted) mean number of patents applied for, Yit,
by firm i in year t by E(Yit|xit, ηi) = exitβ+ηi . The exponential specification is
standard in the patenting literature. The vector xit denotes observable patent
production determinants, including the discounted stock of past patent appli-
cations and measures of the size and composition of the labor force as well as
standard controls as detailed in the previous sections. The parameter vector β
contains the corresponding parameters. The term ηi captures unobserved differ-
ences between firms in terms of their permanent patent productivity. It is proxied
by two observable items, the pre–sample yearly average number of applications
relative to the total number of EPO applications and a dummy variable for having
at least one EPO patent application in the pre–sample period 1978–1998.
It is commonplace in the count data literature to consider several different
specifications of the conditional variance. We start with a Poisson model, which
imposes equality between the mean and the variance, since the conditional mean
function of that model is robust to various types of mis–specification such as
heteroskedasticity and multiplicative unobserved heterogeneity. We also consider
a negative binomial model that allows the variance to exceed the mean, a phe-
nomenon called “overdispersion”. This is commonly found in patent data, and
it is economically motivated by unobserved firm–specific heterogeneity. We use
a very flexible specification of the negative binomial model, denoted RE NegBin,
in which the dispersion parameter can vary randomly between firms.
5 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for two different samples: the full estima-
tion sample of 90,725 firms with a total of 206,645 in–sample observations and a
subsample of 14,811 firms that employ at least one R&D worker (16.3 per cent
of the full sample). The latter sample should include most R&D active firms
and is be used for checking the robustness of our results in Section 7. It includes
31,193 firm–year observations (15.1 per cent of the full sample) and accounts for
96.7 per cent of the total number of patents. Overall patenting acitivity is fairly
modest with the average patenter applying for 1.4 patents per year.
Regarding firm size as measured by the number of employees, the standard pic-
ture emerges: patenters are on average much larger than non–patenters although
there are very small firms among the patenters (firms with just one employee)
as well as very large non–patenting firms (with a maximum of more than 26,000
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employees).
Insert Table 1 about here!
Table 1 also details the distribution of firm, year observations over groups of
workers with differences in terms of the relevance of their education for R&D,
their mobility status in the present year (joiners vs. stayers), and whether or not
they were exposed to patenting in the previous year. For the full sample, the
table shows that 21 per cent of workers in patenting firms are classified as R&D
workers. Of those workers, around one in five was mobile during any given year.
The mobility status could be determined for the vast majority (97 per cent) of
R&D workers in patenting firms. For non–patenters the corresponding numbers
are lower: only four per cent of workers in non–patenting firms are classified as
R&D workers with one in nine being mobile during any given year.
Within the sample of potentially R&D active firms about one in four workers
is classified as an R&D worker. Somewhat surprisingly, this holds equally for
patenting and non–patenting firms. Again, one in five R&D workers was mobile
during any given year for patenters where mobility was lower among R&D workers
employed by non–patenters (one in nine).
6 Results
We report our empirical results in three steps. First, we comment briefly on the
estimation results. Although the regression coefficients have no direct economic
interpretation, their significance and sign form the basis for later inference. Sec-
ond, to gain insight into the economic magnitude and significance of effects, we
transform our results into more readily interpretable marginal effects. Finally,
we present results each of the hypotheses forwarded in Section 2.
6.1 Estimation results
Our main estimation results are presented in Table 2. This is for the full sample
of 90.725 firms that (i) have at least one employee and (ii) for which all variables
observed. Results are reported both for the standard Poisson model (“Poisson”)
and the random effects Negative Binomial model (“RE NegBin”). Our comments
focus on the latter because the random effects turn out to be statistically strongly
significant. Moreover, our findings are consistent across specifications in terms of
sign and magnitude of the estimated parameters.
Insert Table 2 about here!
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The variables included to control for scale effects, overall mobility, state de-
pendence and unobserved permanent heterogeneity, are all found to be statisti-
cally significant and signed according to expectation.9 First, the estimated scale
effects of the total number of workers and the capital stock (both in logs) are
positive and statistically significant. Second, the overall growth rate of the firm’s
workforce is strongly and positively related to patenting activity, reflecting the
prevalence of “growth firms”among patenters. Third, like other existing studies
that consider dynamic specifications, we find ample evidence for positive state
dependence in patenting.
The standard term included to capture state dependence, the lagged dis-
counted stock of patents, has a positive and statistically significant impact on
current patenting activity according to the RE NegBin results. Although pos-
itive, the term is not significant in the Poisson model. This effect remains an
important determinant of patenting even though our specification includes an
extended set of human capital variables. This suggests that innovation involves
dynamic processes inside the firm and in the product market that are not ex-
plained by the changes in the firm’s use of human capital.
Finally, our PSME proxies for unobserved permanent heterogeneity, the fixed
effect dummy variable for patenting activity prior to 1999, and the continuous
measure ln(fixed effect) based on the mean pre–sample patent count, both add
positively and significantly to current patenting activity. This is consistent with
the pre–sample level of patenting reflecting permanent differences among firms
in their unobserved patent abilities.
Our results for composition effects related to the shares of different labor
types (relative to the reference share of non–exposed non–R&D workers), are
also in line with our expectations. A central finding is that R&D workers in the
current workforce (i.e. joiners, stayers, and graduates) contribute positively and
significantly to patenting. In contrast, we generally find little effects of non–R&D
workers. Only for non–R&D stayers with patent exposure do we find an effect
which is statistically significant at the ten per cent level. The weak effects for
non–R&D workers suggest that our classification of R&D workers is sufficiently
broad to include most workers that contribute to the production of patentable
inventions.
Finally, the picture is mixed for leavers. As expected, we obtain a negative
(although insignificant) effect for R&D leavers with patent exposure. For non–
R&D leavers with no exposure there is a negative and statistically significant
impact on the previous employer. Contrary to our expectations, R&D leavers
without patent exposure and non R&D workers leaving firms that did apply for
9Our specification also includes 14 sectoral dummies, 14 regional dummies, year dummies
for 2001 and 2002, and a constant term.
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a patent in the previous period have significant and positive effects on current
patenting. An explanation could be that workers leaving facilitate a redirection
of R&D activities by opening up positions for workers with different skills and
weakening the resistance to change often experienced in established firms (Morrill,
1991).
6.2 Marginal Effects
In a second step, we calculate the marginal effect of changing the number of work-
ers in each group on the number of patent applications. These calculations are
based on the RE NegBin estimation results. Table 3 reports the marginal effects
in order to obtain an idea about the quantitative significance of the estimation
results. These are the absolute changes in the expected number of patents from
adding one additional worker of a particular type to the current workforce, or
subtracting a worker in the case of leavers. This calculation is performed for each
group of R&D or non–R&D workers.
Insert Table 3 about here!
For the sample that includes all firms, the effects are generally modest, ranging
from a 0.01 increase in the number of patent applications for one R&D joiner
with patent exposure to a 0.002 increase for a non–R&D stayer without patent
exposure. Interestingly, R&D graduates have a higher patent productivity than
R&D stayers without exposure. A possible interpretation of this result could be
that these workers bring knowledge of the recent developments in the field to the
firm, which increases patenting activity.
Restricting attention to firms that already had applied for a patent in the
pre–sample period, the marginal effects are generally stronger. The effect of
an additional worker ranges here from a 0.06 increase in the number of patent
applications for a R&D joiner with patent exposure to a 0.007 increase for a
non–R&D stayer without patent exposure. Given the ample evidence for state
dependence and the importance of pre–sample patents for current patents, these
firms are likely to do more R&D than the average Danish firm in the sample
period as well, this shows that acquisition of skills and knowledge through the
labor market is more important for R&D active firms.
6.3 Tests of Economic Hypotheses
As the final step of our empirical analysis we investigate the validity of the eco-
nomic hypotheses forwarded in Section 2. We base this inference on the differ-
ences in the estimated γ and δ coefficients from Equation (1).
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Our results for the full model are summarized in Table 4. The first column
shows if the estimated differences are in the direction predicted by theory. The
second and third columns record the χ2 statistic and the p-value associated with
each hypothesis. We consider a p-value of less than ten per cent as supporting
our economic hypotheses. The final column concludes if the economic hypothesis
is validated which is the case if the estimated difference is statistically significant
and signed according to theory.
First, the empirical evidence strongly corroborates Hypothesis 1 which was
forwarded mainly as a consistency check for the R&D worker definition. R&D
workers contribute significantly more than non–R&D workers regardless of whether
they are joiners or stayers and if they have been previously exposed to patenting
or not.
Second, there are strong effects of patent exposure in the directions suggested
by theory. For joiners, Hypothesis 2(a), we find a positive productivity differential
for R&D workers.10 This supports the interpretation that knowledge obtained
from previous patenting is transferred between firms by worker flows. For stayers,
Hypothesis 2(b), we also find evidence that R&D workers with recent experience
working in a firm that applied for a patent contribute more to patenting activity
than workers with no such experience.
Third, there is strong evidence that the mobility of R&D workers increases
the joint patenting of the donor and the recipient firm, Hypothesis 3(a). It is
important to notice that this result is not contaminated by observable differences
between joiners and leavers. As we have data for the entire Danish labor force,
leavers in one firm are joiners in another firm.11 The additional patenting ac-
tivity resulting from mobility therefore represents a true increase in patenting.
For non–R&D workers the positive effect of mobility on patenting is weaker, pre-
sumably because these workers contribute less to innovation. The results are
only significant for workers without exposure where the difference is also signed
according to theory.
Fourth, there is no strong evidence for the implication of the model that
an R&D leaver with exposure subtracts more from the donor firm’s patenting
activity than a R&D leaver without exposure, Hypothesis 4. The difference has
the sign predicted but it is statistically not significant.
Fifth, with regard to “absorptive capacity” our empirical results for Hypothe-
ses 5(a) - (c) point in the direction suggested by theory, although p-values are
in the inconclusive range. There is thus weak evidence that formal R&D qual-
10While the former is strongly significant, the latter is small and statistically insignificant.
11Unemployment rates in the period 1999–2002 have been between 4 per cent and 4.8 per
cent.
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ifications matter for the ability of individuals to gain from previous patenting
exposure and to transfer knowledge, both to a new firm and to future periods
within the current firm.
Insert Table 4 about here!
7 Robustness checks
7.1 R&D active firms
We noted in Section 5 that the main analysis is conducted on a very broad
sample of firms excluding only firms in sectors with no patenting activity between
1978 and 2002. This clearly includes many firms which are not active in R&D
and therefore very unlikely to patent. In order to check the robustness of our
main results we now re–estimate the model on a much more selective sample of
firms that employ at least one R&D worker. Estimation results are presented in
Appendix E.
Comparing the RE NegBin results on the full sample in Table 2 and the
selected sample, we find that the main terms remain strongly significant. The
effects of current worker groups remain positive but become smaller in magnitude.
The coefficients of the control variables included for firm size, employment growth
and pre–sample patenting are very similar between the two sets of results. In
fact, the main differences arise for two groups of non–R&D workers, the recent
graduates and the non exposed leavers. These effects become larger in magnitude
and retain their original signs in the selected sample.
The overall robustness of the estimation results is reflected in similar results
for the tests of our economic hypotheses. The only changes in terms of overall
conclusions that are reported in Table 4, are that hypotheses H.4a and H.5(b)
cannot be rejected for the selected sample.
7.2 Alternative R&D worker definitions
Our main analysis relies on the proper definition of an R&D worker. As noted
above, our adopted definition is consistent with survey evidence on the educa-
tional level of actual inventors. In this subsection we check the robustness of our
results to the scope of this definition.
Specifically, we consider a “narrow” definition of R&D workers including only
workers with a long R&D–related education (master’s or Ph.D. level), and a
“broad” definition, which comprises also of workers with a short R&D–related
education like laboratory technicians or process technicians.
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We summarize the results of re–estimating the model for the two additional
definitions of R&D workers by presenting the resulting marginal effects in Ap-
pendix F. Comparing effects for each worker group across definitions — either
for the full sample or for firms with at least one pre–sample patent — we find
that the signs for all significant effects are unchanged. In fact, a fairly consistent
picture emerges: marginal effects are stronger when using a narrow definition and
become weaker when broadening the definition.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we assess the quantitative importance of mobility for innovation by
measuring how labor mobility affects the patenting activity of Danish firms. For
this purpose, we have constructed a data set that combines patent applications by
Danish firms to the European Patent Office between 1978 and 2002 with matched
employer–employee register data that essentially contains a complete record of
mobility in the Danish labor market. The linked employer–employee register data
span the period 1999–2002. Unlike previous studies of mobility and innovation
that rely on patent data, we are able to observe moves that are “unsuccessful” in
the sense of not leading to a patent application by the new employer.
Our results pertain therefore to the average effect of mobility for an average
worker of different types. We differentiate workers along three dimension: (i)
R&D workers vs. non–R&D workers, (ii) workers who changed workplaces vs.
workers who did not and (iii) workers who were employed by a firm that applied
for patent in a previous period vs. who were not employed by such a firm.
The differentiated effects of these worker groups are of central importance
when trying to assess the significance of mobility for innovation at the regional
or national level. Furthermore, our paper complements previous studies that
have focused on star scientist (Almeida and Kogut, 1999) or top–level managers
(Boeker, 1997).
We find that R&D joiners coming from a firm that recently applied for a
patent contribute more to patenting activity than R&D joiners with similar ob-
servable characteristics but coming from a firm that did not previously apply for
a patent. Recent patenting experience is also associated with a higher patent
productivity for workers staying in the firm. These findings are consistent with
the notion that workers employed in patenting firm acquire knowledge and skills
that increase their productivity in the production of new inventions. We also find
weak evidence for the notion that workers with an R&D–relevant education have
a larger absorptive capacity than other workers.
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For the average firm, the effects of mobility on patenting activity are generally
modest: an increase in the number of R&D joiners who come from a patenting
firm — this is the most productive group of workers — is associated with an
absolute increase in the number of patents by 0.0112.
This result reflects the fact that only a small fraction of “average” firms are in-
volved in patenting activity. Most of the mobility labor is therefore between firms
that never apply for a patent. Restricting attention to firms that already applied
for a patent before 1999 (the beginning of our period of analysis) the quantitative
effects are stronger: one additional previously “patent–exposed” R&D joiner con-
tributes 0.0646 additional patents on average. Since these firms are likely to do
more R&D than the average Danish firm in the sample period, this indicates that
acquisition of skills and knowledge through the labor market is more important
for R&D active firms.
Our study is to the best of our knowledge the first to consider the effect
of mobility on the performance of both recipient and donor firms. We show
that the mobility of R&D workers increases the joint patenting activity of the
donor and the recipient firm. This is a notable result that provides quantitative
support for the notion that interfirm mobility is an engine for innovation also at
the aggregate level. Saxenian (1994) has forcefully argued that “job–hopping”
is key to the success of Silicon Valley, and our results suggest that something
similar, although perhaps to a lesser extent, is true also outside the world’s most
prominent high–tech cluster.
More generally, our result show that firms are not involved in a zero–sum game
when competing for labor. A certain labor turnover among the R&D personnel
can increase the firm’s capacity for innovation. Losing workers to other firms
might result in a loss of capacity but this can be more than compensated for by
the skills and knowledge of the workers joining the firm.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium mobility outcome for exposed and non–exposed R&D work-
ers
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Figure 1 shows the equilibrium mobility outcome for exposed and non–exposed R&D workers.
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Table 2: Estimation results
Poisson RE NegBin
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Disc. stock of applications 0.000 0.000 0.004*** 0.001
ln(# workers) 0.321*** 0.054 0.494*** 0.051
ln(capital stock) 0.136*** 0.035 0.061** 0.028
∆ ln(# workers) 0.399*** 0.129 0.418*** 0.115
ln(fixed effect) 0.468*** 0.056 0.489*** 0.063
Fixed effect dummy 6.896*** 0.553 6.913*** 0.551
Constant -9.005*** 0.459 -8.380*** 0.446
Worker shares
Share R&D joiners w/ exp. 3.697*** 0.661 4.063*** 0.553
Share R&D joiners w/o exp. 3.080*** 0.423 2.869*** 0.437
Share R&D stayers w/ exp. 2.294*** 0.517 2.513*** 0.556
Share R&D stayers w/o exp. 1.208*** 0.482 1.344*** 0.442
Share R&D graduates 2.410*** 0.713 2.640*** 0.616
Share non–R&D joiners w/ exp. 0.772*** 0.333 0.146 0.507
Share non–R&D joiners w/o exp. 0.751*** 0.242 0.126 0.261
Share non–R&D stayers w/ exp. 1.052*** 0.248 0.432* 0.232
Share non–R&D graduates 0.985** 0.426 0.671 0.450
Share R&D leavers w/ exposure 0.360* 0.212 -0.467 0.986
Share R&D leavers w/o exposure 0.829*** 0.167 0.537** 0.246
Share non–R&D leavers w/ exposure 0.118*** 0.048 0.221* 0.123
Share non–R&D leavers w/o exposure -1.499 1.381 -0.741* 0.395
Tests for joint significance
Sector dummies 46.33 0.000 110.93 0.000
Region dummies 46.01 0.000 13.54 0.484
Year dummies 156.93 0.000 182.77 0.000
# of obs. and specification tests
# obs. 206,645
# firms 90,725
# firms w/ patent 352
# patents, citations weighted 1,987
# patents 484
Pseudo R2 0.180 0.071
Table 2 displays coefficient estimates for the Poisson and the random effects NegBin model.
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Table 3: Marginal effects
At least
one pre–
All sample
firms patent
M.E. p–val. M.E. p–val.
R&D joiners w/ exposure 0.0112 0.000 0.0646 0.004
R&D joiners w/o exposure 0.0085 0.000 0.0476 0.005
R&D stayers w/ exposure 0.0076 0.000 0.0426 0.013
R&D stayers w/o exposure 0.0049 0.001 0.0259 0.023
R&D graduates 0.0079 0.000 0.0444 0.013
Non R&D joiners w/ exposure 0.0022 0.079 0.0089 0.249
Non R&D joiners w/o exposure 0.0021 0.008 0.0086 0.088
Non R&D stayers w/ exposure 0.0028 0.000 0.0129 0.013
Non R&D stayers w/o exposure 0.0018 0.000 0.0068 0.051
Non R&D graduates 0.0034 0.012 0.0163 0.071
R&D leavers w/ exposure -0.0011 0.638 -0.0066 0.640
R&D leavers w/o exposure 0.0012 0.026 0.0076 0.057
Non R&D leavers w/ exposure 0.0005 0.091 0.0031 0.134
Non R&D leavers w/o exposure -0.0017 0.000 -0.0105 0.002
Table 3 displays the absolute change in the number of expected patents due to an increase in
the number of workers in the respective skill groups by one. The calculation of these marginal
effects is based on the coefficient estimates for the RE NegBin model displayed in Table 2. The
marginal effects are calculated for the average firm in our data (left part of the table) and for
firms that patented prior to 1999 (right part of the table). The calculation of the marginal
effects is explained in Appendix C.
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Appendix A: formal proof of Hypothesis 4
As a first step in the proof, we determine the outcome of the competition for
the workers. Suppose here that the current employer (i.e. donor firm) carries a
fraction α of the cost of mobility V . The donor firm’s valuation of an exposed and
of a non exposed worker are thus VD+s+αV and VD+αV , respectively, because
there is no cost of mobility if the worker is retained. The potential employer (i.e.
the recepient firm) values both an exposed and a non exposed VR − (1 − α)V ,
because the knowledge that the exposed worker possesses remains with the firm
if the worker leaves.
Competition for workers is modeled in the following way: the firms make a
take–it–or–leave–it offer to the worker. The worker is then hired by the firm
offering the highest wage. As tie–breaking rule, we assume that the firm whose
valuation of the employee is highest hires him. This ensures an equilibrium in
pure strategies. In equilibrium the firm with the highest valuation of the worker
hires him paying the valuation of the other firm. Therefore, mobility takes place
if and only if:
Non exposed R&D worker : VR − VD︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net benefit from mobility
≥ V︸︷︷︸
Cost of mobility
,
Exposed R&D worker : VR + s− VD︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net benefit from mobility
≥ V︸︷︷︸
Cost of mobility
.
Suppose that V R ≥ V D ≥ s− V > 0 and V R − V ≤ V D as in Figure 1. The
proofs for the other possible cases are similar. Then, the expected loss of the
donor firm conditional on mobility is given by
E(VD exposed R&D worker | Mobility) =∫ V D+V−s
0
f(VR | Mobility)(VR + s− V )/2dVR +∫ V R
V D+V−s
f(VR | Mobility)V D/2dVR,
where the density function conditional on mobility is given by
f(VR | Mobility) = VR + s− V
V DV R − (V D − s+ V )2/2
.
Simplifying expressions, we obtain
E(VD exposed R&D worker | Mobility) = (V D − s+ V )
2(2V D + s− V )− 3V 2DV R
3((V D − s+ V )2 − 2V DV R)
.
It can be shown that E(VD exposed R&D worker | Mobility) is increasing in s.
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Consider instead a non exposed worker. Here,
E(VD non exposed R&D worker | Mobility) =
∫ V R
V
g(VR | Mobility)(VR+s−V )/2dVR,
where the density function conditional on mobility is given by
g(VR | Mobility) = VR − V
(V R − V )2/2
.
Simplifying expressions, we obtain
E(VD non exposed R&D worker | Mobility) = V R − V
3
.
We are now ready to prove Hypothesis 4 for the example considered.
Proposition 1 For V R ≥ V D ≥ s − V > 0 and V R − V ≤ V D, the expected
loss of the donor firm conditional on mobility occurring is greater for an exposed
R&D worker than for a non exposed R&D worker.
Proof. Consider first s = V where
V D(3V R − 2V D)
3(2V R − V D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(VD exposed R&D worker|Mobility)
>
V R − V
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(VD non exposed R&D worker|Mobility)
,
because V D > V R−V and (3V R−2V D)/(2V R−V D) > 1. The proof follows then
from E(VD exposed R&D worker | Mobility) being continuous and increasing in
s.
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Appendix B: definition of R&D workers
We define “R&D workers” vs. “non–R&D workers” by using information on the
highest level of education attained by the worker. We differentiate between nine
skill groups in total: (1) “Unskilled workers”, workers without a completed for-
mal education; (2) “Skilled workers”, workers with completed formal education
like plumbers, electricians, blacksmiths, carpenters, photographers or waiters; (3)
“R&D technicians”, workers with a technical education in R&D–related subjects
like process technicians, food processing technicians, dairy farm technicians, lab-
oratory technicians or food business engineers; (4) “Other technicians”; workers
with a technical education in non–R&D–related subjects like multi media de-
signer, visualizer, actor, real estate agent, hotel technician, transport logistics; (5)
“R&D medium length”; workers with a medium length education in R&D–related
subjects like machine engineer, electrical engineer, food business engineer, archi-
tect, chemists, construction engineer, bio analytic; (6) “Other medium length”;
workers with a medium length education in non–R&D–related subjects like so-
cial workers, high school teacher, journalist, librarian, photo journalist, language
degrees, musician, insurance agent; (7) “R&D long”; workers with a bachelor or
master in R&D–related subjects like natural sciences, technology, mathematics,
statistics, physics, chemistry, biology; (8) “Non R&D long”; workers with a bach-
elor or master in non–R&D–related subjects like humanities, theology, religion,
history of thought, literature, languages and (9) “Unknown education”; workers
with an education unknown to Statistics Denmark. The latter is our “graduate”
category.
We consider three different definitions for R&D workers, (i) a “narrow” one
which defines R&D workers as workers with a long R&D education (skill group
(7)), (ii) a “medium” definition that includes both workers with a long R&D
education and and workers with a medium length R&D education (skill groups 5
and 7) and (iii) a “broad” definition that comprises also of workers with a short
R&D education (skill groups 3, 5 and 7). We focus attention on the medium
definition of R&D workers but present key results for the alternative definitions
in Appendix E. Our medium definition corresponds most closely to the finding
of Kaiser (2006).
35
Appendix C: calculation of marginal effects
Recall that the conditional mean function for a count data model is E(Yit|xit, ηi) =
eXitβ+ηi .
Given our definition of human capital variables as in Equation (1), the marginal
effect of a worker from the kth skill group related to joiners or stayers on patent-
ing activity — e.g. the absolute change in the number of patents due to a one
unit (one worker) change in the number of workers of skill group — then is:
ηP,Lk =
E(Yˆit)
TT
(
γk −
∑9
k=1 γksk −
∑1
l=11 4δlrl
TT
+ β
∆# workers + β# workers
)
, (3)
where TT denotes the total number of workers and β
∆# workers and β# workers
denote the coefficients corresponding to the change in the natural logarithm of
the number of workers and the natural logarithm of the total number of workers.
The marginal effect of the rth leaver skill group is:
ηP,Lr =
δl
TT
. (4)
We evaluate the marginal effects at the means of the involved variables through-
out this paper.
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Appendix D: trend correction of the PSME
Let TP denote the number of pre–sample observations on the dependent variable,
let Yit denote the number of patents applied for by firm i in year t, let Sit denote
latent innovation search activity as in Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1995),
let A denote a “measure” of all firms and let θt aggregate time effect in year
t. These are all macro–economic effects including business cycle effects, general
patenting propensity (vs. secrecy), the propensity to patent at the EPO, etc.
This term is not restricted in any special way across time and it is the same for
all firms.
Assume that Yit = Sitθt. We define our weighted proxy variable for firm–
specific fixed effects, FEi, by
FEi =
1
TP
TP∑
t=1
Yit∑
j∈A Yjt
=
1
TP
TP∑
t=1
Sitθt∑
j∈A Sjtθt
Define Sit = Si+uit where Si as the Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1995)
equilibrium value which is proportional to the firm fixed effect, ηi, and uit simply
defines the deviation from equilibrium for firm i at time t. Assume further that
these deviations add to zero across all firms at any given point in time (note that
general business cycles are part of θt). Then,
=
1
TP
TP∑
t=1
Si + uit∑
j∈A(Sj + ujt)
=
1
TP
TP∑
t=1
Si + uit∑
j∈A Sj
=
1∑
j∈A Sj
Si +
1∑
j∈A Sj
1
TP
TP∑
t=1
uit
The last term goes to zero in expectation as TP increases (which is essentially the
same as argument in Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen, 1995). The first term
is proportional to Si which in turn proxies ηi as in Blundell, Griffith and van
Reenen (1995).
Essentially, we now allow non–stationarity in a way that vanishes once the
fixed effect proxies are weighted, is an appropriate representation of business cy-
cle, general patenting propensity (vs. secrecy), EPO patenting propensity effects
etc. and is not restricted across time.
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Appendix E: estimation result for model that considers
only firms with at least one R&D worker
Poisson RE NegBin
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Disc. stock of applications 0.000 0.000 0.004*** 0.001
ln(# workers) 0.245*** 0.059 0.372*** 0.056
ln(capital stock) 0.123*** 0.035 0.048* 0.029
∆ ln(# workers) 0.317*** 0.130 0.302*** 0.121
ln(fixed effect) 0.474*** 0.058 0.517*** 0.064
Fixed effect dummy 6.418*** 0.551 6.758*** 0.564
Constant -7.238*** 0.593 -6.877*** 0.511
Skill shares
Share R&D joiners w/ exp. 3.027*** 0.640 3.268*** 0.551
Share R&D joiners w/o exp. 2.132*** 0.476 1.972*** 0.468
Share R&D stayers w/ exp. 1.845*** 0.548 1.902*** 0.592
Share R&D stayers w/o exp. -0.035 0.559 0.212 0.508
Share R&D graduates 1.529* 0.816 1.651*** 0.649
Share non–R&D joiners w/ exp. 0.624* 0.334 0.222 0.503
Share non–R&D joiners w/o exp. 0.746*** 0.285 0.148 0.297
Share non–R&D stayers w/ exp. 0.903*** 0.262 0.511** 0.232
Share non–R&D graduates 2.132*** 0.557 1.694*** 0.575
Share R&D leavers w/ exposure 0.248 0.245 -0.261 0.815
Share R&D leavers w/o exposure -0.044 0.851 -0.193 0.982
Share non–R&D leavers w/ exposure 0.100** 0.048 0.191* 0.110
Share non–R&D leavers w/o exposure -4.355** 2.137 -2.140*** 0.747
Tests for joint significance
Sector dummies 39.02 0.000 62.13 0.000
Region dummies 49.67 0.000 13.67 0.475
Year dummies 152.93 0.000 161.21 0.000
# of obs. and specification tests
# obs. 31,193
# firms 14,811
# firms w/ patent 308
# patents 1,916
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.071
The table displays Poisson and RE NegBin estimation results for our model that considers firms
with at least one R&D worker only.
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Appendix F: alternative definitions of R&D workers
At least
one pre–
All sample
firms patent
M.E. p–val. M.E. p–val.
Narrow definition of R&D workers
R&D joiners w/ exposure 0.0139 0.000 0.0824 0.004
R&D joiners w/o exposure 0.0113 0.000 0.0663 0.005
R&D stayers w/ exposure 0.0112 0.001 0.0656 0.015
R&D stayers w/o exposure 0.0064 0.006 0.0359 0.037
R&D graduates 0.0115 0.000 0.0677 0.009
Non R&D joiners w/ exposure 0.0044 0.007 0.0228 0.044
Non R&D joiners w/o exposure 0.0034 0.002 0.0172 0.027
Non R&D stayers w/ exposure 0.0038 0.000 0.0193 0.009
Non R&D stayers w/o exposure 0.0024 0.000 0.0104 0.035
Non R&D graduates 0.0036 0.032 0.0179 0.110
R&D leavers w/ exposure -0.0059 0.255 -0.0369 0.266
R&D leavers w/o exposure -0.0041 0.380 -0.0257 0.390
Non R&D leavers w/ exposure 0.0007 0.063 0.0046 0.106
Non R&D leavers w/o exposure -0.0005 0.173 -0.0032 0.204
Main definition (medium definition) of R&D workers
R&D joiners w/ exposure 0.0112 0.000 0.0646 0.004
R&D joiners w/o exposure 0.0085 0.000 0.0476 0.005
R&D stayers w/ exposure 0.0076 0.000 0.0426 0.013
R&D stayers w/o exposure 0.0049 0.001 0.0259 0.023
R&D graduates 0.0079 0.000 0.0444 0.013
Non R&D joiners w/ exposure 0.0022 0.079 0.0089 0.249
Non R&D joiners w/o exposure 0.0021 0.008 0.0086 0.088
Non R&D stayers w/ exposure 0.0028 0.000 0.0129 0.013
Non R&D stayers w/o exposure 0.0018 0.000 0.0068 0.051
Non R&D graduates 0.0034 0.012 0.0163 0.071
R&D leavers w/ exposure -0.0011 0.638 -0.0066 0.640
R&D leavers w/o exposure 0.0012 0.026 0.0076 0.057
Non R&D leavers w/ exposure 0.0005 0.091 0.0031 0.134
Non R&D leavers w/o exposure -0.0017 0.000 -0.0105 0.002
Broad definition of R&D workers
R&D joiners w/ exposure 0.0101 0.000 0.0571 0.006
R&D joiners w/o exposure 0.0078 0.000 0.0429 0.006
R&D stayers w/ exposure 0.0072 0.000 0.0393 0.011
R&D stayers w/o exposure 0.0054 0.001 0.0280 0.016
R&D graduates 0.0072 0.001 0.0393 0.018
Non R&D joiners w/ exposure 0.0014 0.300 0.0036 0.667
Non R&D joiners w/o exposure 0.0019 0.016 0.0063 0.170
Non R&D stayers w/ exposure 0.0025 0.000 0.0105 0.021
Non R&D stayers w/o exposure 0.0016 0.001 0.0043 0.129
Non R&D graduates 0.0034 0.009 0.0158 0.068
R&D leavers w/ exposure -0.0010 0.523 -0.0064 0.529
R&D leavers w/o exposure 0.0009 0.045 0.0055 0.082
Non R&D leavers w/ exposure 0.0006 0.054 0.0037 0.091
Non R&D leavers w/o exposure -0.0016 0.000 -0.0100 0.003
The Table displays the absolute change in the number of patents due a an increase in the number
of workers in the respective skill groups by one. The calculation of these marginal effects is
based on the coefficient estimates for RE NegBin models that were specified for alternative
definitions of R&D workers. The marginal effects are calculated for the average firm in our
data (left part of the table) and for firms that patented prior to 1999 (right part of the table).
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